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ABSTRACT:  
This research aims to answer the reason behind the stalled progress of dis pute 
settlement in East China Sea between Japan and China, despite a high initial 
commitment to cooperate under “2008 Japan-China Agreement on Cooperation 
for the Development of East China Sea Resources” framework. This research was 
done qualitatively by amassing reliable literatures and relevant official 
documents. In accomplishing the research objective, this article employs 
common-pool resource (CPR) and security dilemma concepts to analyze the 
collected data. This research finds that the reason why the 2008 Agreement, 
which intended to make East China Sea as common-pool resource for Japan and 
China, did not work is due to the lack of institutional supply and commitment. The 
insufficient institutional supply was occurred since Japan and China, as appropriators 
of the CPR, were seeking less binding and more flexible rules. Even though that maximum 
result could be attained through high commitment, both Japan and China were not 
assured about each other intentions. Thus, the cooperation is stalled. 
Keywords: common-pool resource, security dilemma, Japan, China, East China Sea. 
 
ABSTRAK: 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menjawab alasan di balik tersendatnya kemajuan 
penyelesaian sengketa di Laut Cina Timur antara Jepang dan Cina, meskipun 
komitmen awal yang tinggi untuk bekerja sama di bawah “Perjanjian Jepang-
Cina 2008 tentang Kerjasama untuk Pengembangan Sumber Daya Laut Cina 
Timur” kerangka. Penelitian ini dilakukan secara kualitatif dengan 
mengumpulkan literatur yang dapat dipercaya dan dokumen resmi yang relevan. 
Dalam mencapai tujuan penelitian, artikel ini menggunakan konsep common-
pool resource (CPR) dan security dilemma untuk menganalisis data yang 
dikumpulkan. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa alasan mengapa Perjanjian 
2008, yang dimaksudkan untuk menjadikan Laut Cina Timur sebagai sumber 
daya bersama untuk Jepang dan Cina, tidak berhasil adalah karena kurangnya 
pasokan dan komitmen kelembagaan. Pasokan institusional yang tidak 
mencukupi terjadi karena Jepang dan Cina, sebagai pemilik CPR, mencari 
aturan yang kurang mengikat dan lebih fleksibel. Meski hasil maksimal itu bisa 
dicapai melalui komitmen tinggi, baik Jepang maupun China tidak yakin akan 
niat masing-masing. Dengan demikian, kerja sama terhenti. 
Kata Kunci: Sumber daya; dilema keamanan; Jepang; Cina; Laut Cina Timur 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 1971, East China Sea has been very tense for 
several countries in East Asia, particularly Japan and 
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China due to the overlapping claims of Senkaku/Diayou 
Islands and energy competition in the Islands area (Roy-
Chaudhury, 2016). After decades of militarily maritime 
tension fluctuation, in 2004 the direct skirmishes over the 
energy resources around the Islands emerged. On that year, 
China established a natural gas site near the median line, 
allegedly to acquire natural gas from the Senkaku/Diayou 
Islands and to establish fait accompli of the Islands water 
control (Ueki, 2006). The urgency of maritime security 
escalated ever since. To pacify the tension and to maintain 
maritime stability, cooperative endeavors had been initiated 
by China and Japan. More specifically, to shape the East 
China Sea as the “Sea of Peace, Cooperation and 
Friendship,” Japan and China established “The 2008 Japan-
China Agreement on Cooperation for the Development of 
East China Sea Resources” (Hayashi, 2011). By the Agreement, 
the two countries agreed to cooperate in (1) achieving con- crete 
maritime border delimitation without prejudice on each 
other’s legal position and (2) allowing Japan energy corporation(s) 
to participate in the Shirakaba/Chunxiao oil and gas field 
explo- ration in accordance to Chinese foreign enterprises 
oil/gas off- shore exploration law (Japan-China Joint Press 
Statement Coop- eration between Japan and China in the 
East China Sea, 2008). This agreement was seen to be decisive 
for both countries progress in resolving the overlapping 
border in the East China Sea since it was expected to a 
delimitation and energy cooperation, instead of fighting 
over claims and energy reserves. In addition, this 
agreement was also vital as it was the momentum where 
Japan and China first started to initiate such cooperation 
regarding the delimitation & joint development in East 
China Sea. 
However, a decade after the agreement, the progress on 
delimitation and stable energy cooperation progress was seen 
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claimed that China had been developing their 16 energy 
exploration units unilaterally without Japan’s consent 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2019). This was seen 
as a counterproductive action against the 2008 
Agreement. In response to this, Chinese government 
objected to Japan’s demand by claiming that China’s oil 
and gas development in the East China Sea is legal and 
justified (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of 
China, 2015). Therefore, this research aims to find the 
cause to the regressive development of the cooperation, 
despite of the promising initial agreement to cooperate.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Current findings are mainly concerned about the 
bilateral trust issues and legal constraints in achieving 
delimitation and joint development in The East China Sea. 
Early in 2008, approaching the agreement signing, (Gao, 
2008) stated that joint development could only work if the 
delimitation issue were settled out first. Meanwhile, 
delimitation issues itself is already a huge constraint as China 
had opted out from obeying Law of the Sea Convention 
(Hamakawa 2006, Li 2010). Therefore, Japan and China 
had to go through trustful a negotiation phase or the two 
agendas will not work otherwise. Subsequent to the 
agreement, (Lee & Kim, 2008) had also explained that it 
would be a great challenge to create multinational 
agreement that manages the resources in the East China 
Sea because (1) Japan and China had relatively 
symmetrical power and (2) they have trust issue among 
each other. Lee and Kim’s findings had emphasized that  the 
negotiations itself would also be constrained by the trust 
issues between Japan and China.  
The economic analysis of (Manicom, 2009), Japan and 
China could lose an incentive to progress in regards to the 
agreement if the global economy is dropping, such as the 





Vol. 12 No. 2 
July 2021 
global oil price drop in 2008. Expanding back into 
perspective of political dynamic, (Hayashi, 2011) stated that 
the bilateral talks regarding the agree- ment progress and 
implementation had been struggling since it was highly 
contingent upon the general bilateral political relations 
among Japan and China. Besides, Hayashi also stated that the 
delimitation and further cooperative progress was also 
challenged by the difficulty to define the joint development 
area, as both countries had different standing legal points. 
(Szechenyi, 2015) also stated that the unilateral gas 
development of China in East China Sea and Japan’s protest 
towards it was caused by the differing legal standing points 
in context of territorial sovereignty in accordance of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone in East China Sea. 
Another group of analysis explain the stall by the 
escalation of the territorial dispute itself and glowing 
nationalistic sentiments. (Iwamoto, 2012) mentioned about 
the importance of situations around the nationalization of 
islands in 2012, perception gaps between two nations. 
(Masuo, 2012) also pointed out how the conflicts in this 
period against Japan hardened Chinese policies in East and 
South China Sea. 
The majority of the findings above emphasized on the 
legal and political instability constraints. However, 
researches that specifically mitigate the political 
instability through security a dilemma approach of Japan and 
China is rare. (Green, Douglas, Hicks, Cooper, & Schaus, 
2017) had elaborated that the crisis resolution is less 
progressive since there is a misperception among Japan and 
China in regards to each other assertiveness. Green and his 
research team stated on their findings that China failed to 
understand that its rising power drove Japan to be insecure. 
Japan, in response also took several actions (such as 
nationalizing the Senkakus in 2012 and increasing its 
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their security, but otherwise inflamed China anger. 
There are established understanding and researches on 
Ja- pan-China relations as well as East Asian security affairs 
in general from security dilemma perspective. (Hughes, 
2016) found that Japan’s increasing military capacity under 
Abe administration since 2012 was reflecting ‘resentful 
realism’. Instead of adding the equilibrium of power in East 
Asia, it has the risk to destabilize the regional security. In 
2017, Suh also stated that the THAAD deployed by United 
States in South Korea will sharpen the security dilemma among 
Northeast Asians, including Japan and China. In (2019) 
Hovhannisyan also emphasized that the instability of Japan-
Sino relations was also rooted from  the security dilemma as 
both countries are constantly building up its weaponries due 
to the insecurity towards each other.  
In common pool resources perspective, (Zhang, 2020) 
explained that the clashes among fishers in South China 
Sea is tragedy of commons, thus required a better sea 
governance to manage the resources. Despite of the 
paramount discussion on security dilemma perspective on 
Japan-China conflict, especially in East China Sea, the analysis 
using common-pool resources is underexplored. Seeing that 
significant part of the tension is rooted from the competition of 
resources in that area, further research using common-pool 
resource concept is necessary. 
Seeing the interconnection of the two concept and overlooked 
usage of the concept to analyze East China Sea conflict, this 
research will employ common-pool resources concept and 
security dilemma. In brief, the problems arise within 
common-pool re- sources could be caused by the insecurity 
of each appropriators’ intention, which is a central premise 
of security dilemma in cooperation context. The further 
relations could be seen in the following detailed 
elaboration of both common-pool resources concept and 
security dilemma. 









This concept of CPR is going to be used to frame the idea 
of the 2008 Japan-China Agreement on Cooperation for 
the Development of East China Sea Resources as a 
proposed institution to pacify the tension in East China Sea 
and why it does not work as expected. Common-pool 
resources means natural manmade resource system 
consisted of resource units that allows appropriators to 
take the benefit from it, aiming to regulate the tragedy of 
the commons (Ostrom, 1990). Ostrom defined re- source 
system as the stock variable with the ability to produce 
maximum number of variable flows. The system consists of 
resource units, which means what the appropriators use or 
consume from the resource system. The appropriators are 
the ones who act as beneficiaries appropriating the 
resource units from the resource system. 
According to (Ostrom, 1990), the Common-pool 
resources concept was proposed as the institutional 
solution to the unregulated common resources fought over 
the years, which lead to many worsening conflicts in major 
scale. She referred to the work of Hardin (1968), 
explaining that the tragedy of commons represents to the 
threat to the environment whenever too many individuals 
are consuming a scarce resource. This condition is 
worsening since Hardin analogize the situation where people 
are pushed to utilize the resource as much as possible, 
while the other actors are thinking the same way. 
Contextualized with the contemporary security issues, 
despite of the simple resemblance of the resources as pool 
for fisheries, this paper sees it is only a metaphor for a 
bigger problem such as the non-renewable energy 
resources such as oil and gas which often inflame conflict 
among countries. In global scale, the environmental threat caused by 
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insecurity and instability due to tense endeavor from many 
countries to secure energy resources. Added by the fact that 
energy is highly contingent with state’s survival and industrial 
economic activity, such kind of skirmish are becoming more 
likely. In averting such confrontations and provide fair 
allocation of supply, the usage of the resources was managed 
by an institution, namely Common- pool resources (CPRs). 
The CPRs establishment are coming with set of risks and 
challenges to stabilize the resource withdrawing 
environment. This concept then presents three major 
problem that may arise within the CPRs. Those are (1) the 
problem of supply, (2) the problem of commitment, and (3) 
the problem of mutual monitoring (Ostrom, 1990). 
Different from ‘supply’ in economic definition, this 
concept conveys the problem in supplying institutions in 
managing the CPRs. Distinct from the supply in the 
economic context, this concept conveys the problem in 
supplying institutions in managing the CPRs. Initially, the 
institutions are made to escalate thelevel   of assurance 
among appropriators so there is no party betraying the 
other one. However, adding more institution could be 
problematic as well. Since the actors involved in the CPRs are 
rational actors, they would choose most lucrative 
alternatives among the many institutions available. As each 
of appropriators has different calculations and aiming for the 
highest benefit, there might be distributional issues 
concerning which institutions to choose in managing the 
CPRs. This clash arises due to the rational consideration of 
the appropriators to see that different institution may affect 
the benefit they could gain from the CPRs. 
Subsequent to the supply problem, the CPR might be 
challenged by one or more of the appropriators disobeying 
the rules they have agreed upon at first. The problem of 
commitment arises due to the likelihood where not all actors 
are willing to comply to the institutions they made in the 
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long run. In the best scenario, if everyone follows the initial 
agreements, each of the involved parties will get the 
proportional share from the CPR, leading to a predictable 
withdrawal. However, the appropriators’ preferences, as well as 
the situation in the CPR, are dynamic. This situation often 
pushed appropriators to make new choices that benefits 
them, such as disobeying the rules. 
Lastly, even when the institutions work with firm 
compliance from the appropriators, this concept also sees that 
there is still a possibility of a free-rider within the CPR. Since 
the concept analogize a CPR with a fish pond or a labor 
union, it depicts a situation where there is an external party 
breaching the system and withdraws the resource. To 
prevent such thing from occurring, all appropriators should 
take part in monitoring the CPR. 
 
SECURITY DILEMMA IN COOPERATION CONTEXT 
This research would hypothesize that the stalled 
institutional solution and mistrust among Japan and China 
during the cooperation was caused by the security dilemma 
among them, manifested through arm race among both. 
This concept of security dilemma in cooperation context was 
comprehensively explored by (Jervis, 1978). He stated that: 
unless each actor thinks that the other party will cooperate, it will 
not cooperate. This is because they are insecure about each party’s 
assertiveness toward each other. Insecurity is a legitimate 
rationale to withdraw from that negotiation or cooperation 
process. Jervis also did not neglect that two or more states 
might have a common interest, but a security dilemma is 
causing them to be unable to reach the common goal. He 
described that the security dilemma became the constraint 
to cooperation for three reasons; 
(1) the politics dynamic 
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(3) the increasing security of one state that led to the 
decrease of the others. The picture on how security 
dilemma may affect cooperation was portrayed by Jervis 




Source: Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. 
World Politics, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. 
Details: 
1. All states are cooperating and less assertive 
2. Maintain a high level of armaments while the other 
party does not 
3. All parties maintain a high level or armaments/arm race 
4. Maintain a low level of armaments but the other party 
does the opposite 
 
The table above shows that countries involved in a 
cooperation will be more likely to stay in a CC position 
when all states are willing to cooperate and being less assertive. 
Meanwhile, those countries will express their defective 
manner (DD) if all of the arties are maintaining a high level 
of militarization, or in other words, fighting in an arm race. 
Jervis also went with a possible solution to drag and to 
maintain the cooperating countries into a sustainable CC 
position in 3 ways: (1) Increasing the incentive of 
cooperation (CC) and decreasing the cost if state A 
cooperates but state B does not (CD); (2) decreasing the 
incentive for defecting (DC) and increasing the cost of 
competition (DD) and (3) increasing anything that increase 
the common expectation that both parties will cooperate. 
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Therefore, this theory could be used to analyze the gathered 
data since this theory explains why arm race jeopardizes 
cooperation and what possible solution should be 
attempted to reach sustainable cooperation. 
The Stag Hunt Model will be utilized to analyze how the 
mis- trust and insecurity among Japan and China was formed 
and on how it affects the cooperation process in the 
implementation of 2008 Agreement. The deeper 
characterization of the cooperation constraints due to the 
security  
dilemma also fits with the current status quo in East 
China Sea context of Japan and China tense relationship. 
 









Since this research aims to explain a cause of specific 
case, then qualitative method of case study was employed to 
achieve the research objective. Furthermore, the case study 
approach was chosen due to its ability to expose new variables 
within a causal relationship of a phenomenon (George & 
Bennett, 2005). It fits the goal of the research aiming to expose the 




Cooperate 1 2 
(C) 1 4 
Defect 4 3 
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novel perspective of the cause of stalled cooperation between 
Japan and China using a case of 2008 Agreement. This article 
strategically compiled reliable literatures and relevant valid 
documents to answer the re- search question. The collected 
data was then analyzed with established concepts and 
theories in international politics those are common-pool 
resources (CPRs) concept and security dilemma. 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Japan-China East China Sea Joint Development: 
Common-Pool Resource and its Appropriation Problem 
As highlighted in the theoretical framework, a CPR consisted 
of three elements: (1) resource system, (2) resource unit, and 
(3) appropriators. Prior to investigating the stalled 
negotiation process, this article elaborates the 
conceptualization of the Agree ment as an intended to solve 
a common-pool resource problem. First, the agreement 
formed a resource system for the joint re- source 
development in a specified area and border in East China Sea, 
measured by a detailed set of coordinate points. The agreed 
area includes the Shirakaba/Chunxiao oil and gas field, 
which works as the stock variable that creates the variable 
flows. Sec- ond, related to the first one, the variable flows in 
the CPR are indeed the oil and gas produced by the oil and 
gas rigs within the agreed borders. Third, is the actors 
appropriating the oil and gas field, which are Japan and 
China. 
Notwithstanding with the prospective benefits, Japan 
and China hardly establish a sustainable bond in 
withdrawing the resource from East China Sea. Concept-
wise, these problems could arise from either in the 
institution supply, appropriators’ commitment or 
monitoring process. Among the three possible problems 
arising in a CPR, this article asserts that the major constrains 
jeopardizing Japan and China cooperation process in East 
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China Sea is the first and second problem, which is the 
problem of supply and commitment. First, this paper sees 
that the Agreement is lacking of institutions since both 
appropriators seeks for flexibility and less bindng rules, while 
such cooperation process needs a high level of assurance. By 
design, it is not yet a firm institution since it is an initial 
agreement before reaching a final deal of East China Sea 
dispute. To begin with, according to Vienna Convention metrics, the 
Agreement could not work as a treaty since it is neither le-
gally binding nor having any effect to the domestic constitution of 
both Japan and China (Peterson, 2009). Besides of the no- 
effect, this Agreement also have no enforcement procedure or 
any consequences for non-compliance among the involved 
parties. Even though (Ostrom, 1990) stated that CPR 
emphasizedon the social/community side instead of the 
formal side of the enforcement, the sense of community 
between East Asian countries, in this case Japan and China, is 
also lacking. Unlike South-east Asians who are able to unite 
and maintain the order under ASEAN Community umbrella, 
East Asians are still dealing with historical and political 
issues, unable to institutionalize a sense of community. This 
is not necessarily the mistake of Japan and China since this 
Agreement is not a final decision that creates delimitation for 
the dispute. This situation is less likely to change for the better since 
the legal constraint is still there, as China did not comply to 
UNCLOS as (Hayashi, 2011) and (Szechenyi, 2015) emphasized. 
Therefore, from the CPR concept standpoint, there is a lack of 
institutional supply and no appropriators is urged to change 
the status quo. 
Second, as a parallel consequence of the inadequate rules, 
the appropriator could find a loophole to disobey the rules for 
their benefit. Even when they do not intend to necessarily 
break it, the appropriators could act counterproductive 
manner against the agreed rules simply because it does not 
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China case, Japan was accusing China for breaking the rules 
for unilaterally withdrawing from the CPR without prior 
consultation with Japan, as agreed earlier. China, at the other 
side, was sure that it was exploring oil and gas in Chinese 
maritime jurisdiction. It could be seen from both countries’ 
official statements below: 
“Japan’s request is groundless and China’s relevant oil 
and gas exploration activities in the East China Sea are 
absolutely rightful and legitimate. First, China’s oil and gas 
exploration in the East China Sea is in undisputable waters 
under China’s jurisdiction and completely falls within 
China’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction, which is beyond 
reproach Second, China and Japan have not conducted 
maritime delimitation in the East China Sea and China does 
not recognize the ‘geographical equidistance line’ unilaterally 
drawn by Japan and disagrees to Japan’s so called maritime 
delimitation stance based on the ‘geographical equidistance 
line’”. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of 
China, 2015) 
Japan, who keeps updating its statements concerning this 
is- sue then responded: 
“The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf 
in the East China Sea have not yet been delimited, and Japan 
takes a position that maritime delimitation should be 
conducted based on the geographical equidistance line 
between Japan and China. In this regard, under the 
circumstances pending maritime boundary delimitation, 
it is extremely regrettable that China is advancing uni- 
lateral development, even on the China side of the 
geographical equidistance line. The Government of 
Japan once again strongly requests China to cease its 
unilateral development and to resume negotiations as soon 
as possible on the implementation of the June 2008 
Agreement in which Japan and China agreed to cooperate on 
the development of natural resources in the East China Sea.” 
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(Min- istry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2019) 
As seen from both states’ statements, it could be seen that there 
is a loophole within the Agreement since both parties are 
having different view of the rules. This gap of perception creates 
a distinct notion and mismatch understanding of what they 
can do and can- not do. This situation is less likely to change 
without further trust- worthy negotiation since everyone has 
their own justification, making each action seems unilateral 
and not cooperative.  
How-ever, such proposal will hardly work since United 
States, the state who often appear to defuse regional instability, 
is seen to be biased to Japanese side due to military alliance, while 
impartiality is vital for such mediative enforcements. While 
China also showed less compliance to UNCLOS as a more 
neutral institution, the only way out is through further 
consultation. 
Concerning the third problem, this paper sees that 
context of the Agreement is different with the monitoring 
issue conveyed by Ostrom. The monitoring explained in the theory 
was intended to watch a resource system that was made since 
there is too many possible appropriators, therefore there 
might be potential out- siders withdrawing. Meanwhile, 
the East China Sea CPR does not face any mutual 
monitoring problems since by fact, there is no third party 
appears to be potentially breach the disputed territory. 
Geographically, even if East China Sea is disputed for long by Japan 
and China, the overlapping claims are only made by two 
countries. This CPR was initially made as a response of an 
existing territorial dispute among two major actors with symmetrical 
power. 
 
UNCERTAINTY AND SECURITY DILEMMA IN 
EAST CHINA SEA 
After describing the technical problems with the East 
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occurring at the first place, despite of the initial commitment 
and the high reward if they were cooperating. Using the 
security dilemma theory in cooperation context, this 
research hypothesizes that Japan and China took an inferior 
choice since it is more certain for them, otherwise their 
sovereignty is at stake. It involves the analysis on how the 
arms race between two countries in East China Sea did not 
deescalate despite of the cooperation process, causing trust 
issues to arise. 
As explained by (Jervis, 1978), the uncertainty arises 
when a state feels unsure about the commitment of other 
state to cooperate. Certainty is vital since a state will not stay 
in C-quadrant if the counterpart is not doing the same way. 
As drawn in Table.1, unwillingness emerged since if state 
A stays in C-quadrant and state B does not, they will fall 
into a CD-quadrant, in which a huge loss for A and big 
advantage for B who defects. Seeing this kind of possibility, 
there is a tendency for a state to defect first before the other 
does, making DD-quadrant more certain for cooperating 
parties under security dilemma. 
If state A and state B are ever in the C-quadrant box, 
those states are more likely to stay there since it is an 
equilibrium and all could enjoy the same benefit. However, 
if the incentive or assurance that both parties will stay in C-
quadrant is really low, one state might change their mind 
and defect to protect them- selves. Such situation also 
might occur if there are some misperceptions or errors. 
Jervis also explained that such uncertainty was caused by several 
things. First, it is because international politics is by default 
uncertain. Politics is dynamic, there could be new leader, 
new policies, or new foreign policy orientation, causing 
different calculations in executing the cooperation. In such 
scenario, it is difficult to always adjust the cooperation 
rules and deals to in- crease the disincentives for defection. 
Japan-China relationship is unstable concerning East 
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China Sea security issues. The bilateral talks regarding the 
Agreement progress and implementation had been struggling 
since it is highly contingent upon the general bilateral 
political relations among Japan and China (Hayashi, 
2011). Since the Agreement, there have been series of crisis 
around Senkaku/Diayou Islands in different political 
leaderships. In September 2012, Japan’s prime minister 
Yoshihiko Noda under Democratic Party of Japan uni 
laterally bought three of five privately-owned islands in East 
China Sea, causing ultranationalist anti-Japanese sentiment 
and demonstration in China (Ryall, Japan agrees to buy disputed 
Senkaku islands, 2012). In the following year, China then 
one-sidedly es- tablished “East China Sea Air Defense 
Identification Zone (ADIZ)” that overlaps Japanese claimed 
border, enabling China to fly its aircrafts over the disputed 
maritime domain, causing a negative perception among the 
neighbors (Osawa, 2013). Until 2019, the negotiation is 
stalled and pending, in which Chinese government stated 
that this consultation is suspended due to “trouble stirred 
by Japan”. Added by the new Chinese Coast Guard Law 
taking effect in 2021, the tension will be even stiffer since 
Japan and its close ally United States expressed serious concern 
about the law enabling China to fire at foreign ships in 
China’s claimed waters disputed with Japan (Imahashi & 
Sharp, 2021). Therefore, it showed how the consultation 
could be only resumed under stable bilateral relationship. 
Second, is the insecurity of state over their resources and 
survival. In the anarchical structure, there is always a 
tendency of states to protect their possessions and to control 
resources since in such self help system state needs to ensure 
that their basic needs is secured first. To begin with, 
certainty is hard to achieve in such situation when there is 
no higher authority to assure that the appropriators are not 
breaking the rules for the sake of survival. Thus, (Ostrom, 
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appropriators is necessary to monitor the CPR and impose 
sanctions to keep the performance desirable. How- ever, 
the sense of community between Japan and China to 
establish “self-organized group” to monitor East China Sea is 
also lacking. 
In East China Sea setting, Japan and China have the 
urgencies it takes to push for resources in the disputed area. 
China, as the most populous country in the world, need to 
keep its industry running to serve its people. Japan energy 
consumption is also at stake if they lost the control of 
Senkaku Islands, since 80 per- cent of Japan’s energy is 
foreign imported. Not only that securing the oil and gas rigs 
in East China Sea would help Japan fulfil its energy demand, it 
would also avert China’s domination around the sea lane, creating 
safe shipping lane for energy imports to Japan. 
The third one is the arms race; the evil circle caused by 
the propensity of state to unilaterally fortify its security 
at the expense of others, triggering the surroundings’ anxiety 
and finally doing the same thing in reciprocal. Among 
several mentioned attributions of East China Sea, such as 
energy and border issues, sovereignty is the top priority. 
Sovereignty could be at stake for both Japan and China, they 
will not risk to lose it by letting other party overpower them in 
East China Sea. 
In response to such volatile situation, Japan and China is 
then fortify their armaments, causing arms race. Since 2012, 
Japan, under Shinzo Abe second administration, has been 
gradually escalate its military capacities. Besides keeping on 
increasing the military budget, Japan lifted its military export 
ban in 2014, al- lowing it to modernize its defense industry and 
to transfer weaponries abroad. In the following year, Japan 
established “Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security”, 
allowing it to send troops abroad to for collective self-
defense purposes (Ministry of For- eign Affairs of Japan, 
2015). China does the same thing by keep on increasing its 
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military expenditures and capabilities, even on the faster pace 
than United States (Ryall, 2018). Both Japan and China aim to 
adjust with the changing security environment surrounding 
them, which significantly involving East China Sea dispute. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Utilizing common-pool resource concepts, this paper 
concludes that the problems behind not functioning CPR 
in East China Sea context is the problem of supply and 
commitment. This paper investigates that Japan and China’s 
decision to choose a more inferior alternatives in running the CPR, 
despite of promising returns from the superior quadrants, was 
because the more inferior choice has more certainty over the 
latter under security uncertainties. From here this paper 
learned that a strong institution is built under a strong trust 
and stable relationship among relevant stakeholders. 
This paper sees that by including the Agreement into 
consulations in larger scale would be an effective measure to 
strengthen the institution. Notwithstanding with the 
worsening maritime security fuss among the two 
neighboring countries, both Tokyo and Beijing have a 
growing economic cooperation and manage- able trade 
relationship. It pictures the possibility of both countries to 
cooperate, as long as the incentive is more certain. There fore, by 
putting this issue into a firmer institution, both countries 
could take more benefit from the CPR in East China Sea. 
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